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INTRODUCTION

Members of the legal community have long heralded alternative
dispute resolution ( ADR )1 as a method superior to litigation for
2
resolving contractual disputes. Pre-dispute arbitration is a type of
3
ADR in which parties who enter into a contract waive all rights to sue
4
in favor of a single hearing with a private judge. Advocates argue
5
arbitration is a more expedient process than litigation. Arbitration
6
has simpler procedural and evidentiary rules than litigation, and
arguably provides feuding parties with a less hostile method of
7
resolving their differences. In fact, arbitration can be a very effective
method of resolving disputes, especially between parties with equal
8
bargaining power, such as businesses.
Today, many consumer contracts, those between a consumer and a
business entity for the sale or lease of goods and services, contain an
arbitration clause.9 However, when consumers enter into a contract
with a business entity, they are often unaware that their contracts
1. See Martin A. Frey, Does ADR Offer Second Class Justice?, 36 TULSA L.J. 727, 729
(2001) (including negotiation, mediation and arbitration as alternatives to
litigation).
2. See Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration of Future
Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the Unwary Consumer?, 5 L OY. CONSUMER
L. R EP . 112, 120 n.9 (1993) (noting that former Chief Justice Warren Burger was
among the leading advocates of arbitration).
3. See Anthony Michael Sabino, Ruling Promotes Arbitration, Warns of Costs, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 5, 2001, at 1 (defining arbitration as the most developed and well-accepted
branch of ADR).
4. See Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. R EV. 195, 198 (1998)
(describing a pre-dispute arbitration agreement as a contract clause that obligates
the parties to arbitrate, rather than litigate, any disputes, claims or controversies that
may arise out of the contract).
5. See generally H.R. R EP. N O . 97-542, at 13 (1982) (stating that one of the
advantages of arbitration is that it is usually faster than litigation).
6. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991)
(conceding that the rules governing arbitration are not as extensive or complex as
those followed by federal courts).
7. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (noting
that arbitration normally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of business
dealings between the parties).
8. See Green, supra note 2, at 119 (asserting that arbitration is a strong and
effective dispute resolution tool when both sides knowingly and voluntarily agree to
it); see also Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print: You Cant Sue Us; Arbitration
Clauses Block Consumers From Taking Companies to Court, WASH. P OST, May 22, 1999, at
A1 (reporting that even the most ardent critics of mandatory arbitration
acknowledge it can be effective when properly employed and structured).
9. See Frederick L. Miller, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts; Building
Barriers to Consumer Protection, 78 MICH. B.J. 302, 302 (1999) (observing that
arbitration clauses are fast becoming a standard part of consumer contracts).
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10

contain an arbitration clause. The clause may be included on one
11
of many forms shipped with a product ordered by mail or printed
12
on the reverse side of a service agreement.
The consumer of
average sophistication may not even understand the language of an
13
arbitration clause, let alone its implications.
One implication of mandatory arbitration is that generally, a
consumer must pay substantially more to arbitrate than to litigate a
dispute arising out of a contract for goods or services.14 In
arbitration, a consumer must contribute to the cost of the arbitrator,
15
hearing room, reporter and clerk. In some cases, arbitration can be
cost prohibitive for a consumer seeking to resolve a dispute with a
16
business. Courts have addressed this issue in employment disputes
by ruling that arbitration agreements in employment contracts are
unconscionable when they require an employee, forced to arbitrate,
17
to also pay the arbitration fees.
For example, in Cole v. Burns
10. See Mary Flood, Arbitration Not Always Fair, Cheap for Parties in Dispute, HOUS.
C HRON ., Apr. 11, 2001, at 21 (commenting that most adults with a credit card, long
distance phone service or car insurance have signed away their rights to sue in an
arbitration clause, whether or not they realize it).
11. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998) (discussing a disputed arbitration clause a computer company included with
warranty documents shipped to consumers with the merchandise they had
purchased).
12. See, e.g., Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1429 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(describing the arbitration clause at issue as found in the  General Terms and
Conditions section on the back side of a contract for extermination services).
13. See Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571 (noting that computer purchasers claimed that
the arbitration clause at issue was obscure, and a customer could not reasonably be
expected to appreciate or investigate its meaning and effect); see generally Joseph T.
Mclaughlin, Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States, 59 A LB. L. R EV. 905, 922
(1996) (observing that even if consumers read an arbitration agreement, they likely
may not understand it).
14. See Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(finding that the total cost of arbitration is unlike anything a person would be
required to pay in court).
15. See S. Leonard Scheff, Cave Arbitration, 30 A RIZ. A TTY 11, 11 (1994)
(concluding that arbitration is much more expensive than litigation because in
addition to a steeper filing fee, the parties must pay for many items provided at no
cost to parties litigating in a courtroom).
16. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)
(acknowledging that high arbitration costs could preclude a low-income consumer
from resolving his or her claims arising out of a contract for goods or services).
17. See, e.g., Cole, 105 F.3d at 1469 (finding that an employer cannot require an
employee to arbitrate all disputes and also require the employee to pay all or even
part of the arbitrators fees); see also Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., 163 F.3d
1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999) (following Cole in finding unenforceable an arbitration
agreement that prohibited the use of the judicial forum and required the employee
to pay the arbitrators fees); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054,
1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (Cox, J., concurring) (finding an arbitration agreement that
imposed costs of great magnitude on the employee out of step with statutory policy
on arbitration).
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International Security Services,18 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that requiring an employee to pay excessive
arbitration fees would make that employee unable to pursue any
19
claims against his or her employer. Yet the courts have stopped
short of making such a finding in consumer contracts by continuing
to enforce those that require a consumer to arbitrate all claims and
pay large arbitration fees, whether or not that consumer is financially
20
able to do so.
This Comment argues that the result reached in Cole should apply
equally to consumer contracts.21 Like mandatory arbitration for
employees, mandatory arbitration is unfair to consumers who cannot
afford to arbitrate because it locks them out of the judicial process
22
altogether. Because the Supreme Court has routinely enforced the
arbitration of consumer contracts even in situations of adhesion and
23
unequal bargaining power, this Comment will examine how the
excessive cost of arbitration could bar consumers from vindicating
their claims against businesses, a phenomenon the Supreme Court
24
recently acknowledged in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph.
While at least one federal court has distinguished the argument
that arbitration is cost prohibitive from the argument that arbitration
25
is merely too expensive, this Comment argues that the holding in
Cole should apply to all consumer contracts, not just those in which
18. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
19. See id. at 1484 (holding it unacceptable to require Cole, who had lost his job,

to pay arbitrators fees ranging from $500 to $1,000 per day or more in addition to
administrative and attorneys fees, because doing so would leave him unable to
pursue his claims against his employer).
20. See, e.g., Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91 (2000) (holding that the consumer seeking
to invalidate the arbitration agreement in her contract with a mortgage lender failed
to meet the burden of showing that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive); see
also Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1438 (1998) (holding that the consumer
challenging the arbitration clause in her contract for exterminating services had
failed to prove that she was without recourse merely because she could not afford to
arbitrate).
21. See infra part IV.
22. See infra part IV.B.
23. See, e.g., Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 84 (enforcing the arbitration agreement a lowincome consumer was required to sign in order to receive financing for her mobile
home); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995)
(holding valid an arbitration agreement a consumer inherited, but did not sign
himself, when he purchased a home from previous owners who had signed a lifetime
 Termite Protection Plan that contained the arbitration clause).
24. 531 U.S. 79 (2000); see infra part III.C.
25. See Rollins, 991 F. Supp. at 1437-38 (noting that a consumer complaining that
arbitration fees are excessive can likely still access the arbitral forum, while a
consumer arguing that he or she cannot afford to arbitrate will be locked out of any
forum in which to resolve his or her dispute).
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arbitration is cost prohibitive, so all consumers have equal access to
arbitration and justice. Part II of this Comment explores the history
of the Supreme Courts enforcement of mandatory arbitration,
considers criticisms of the Courts policy on arbitration, and
26
examines the actual costs involved in arbitration. Part III analyzes
three consumer cases in which courts have confronted the
prohibitively high cost of arbitration in consumer contracts, but have
27
failed to resolve the conflict in favor of low-income consumers. Part
IV analyzes the Cole employment contract dispute, in which the court
resolved the issue of arbitration costs in favor of the low-income
28
employee.
Part IV proposes requiring businesses to pay most
arbitration expenses, as the Cole court required employers to do when
they forced their employees to arbitrate, and considers other
recommendations for low-income consumers faced with mandatory
29
arbitration costs. Finally, Part V concludes that a court-created rule
applying Cole to consumer arbitration disputes offers the best solution
30
for consumers forced to arbitrate.
II. HISTORICAL P ERSPECTIVE: BACKGROUND ON A RBITRATION
A. Legislative and Judicial Interpretation
31

In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ( FAA ) in
response to the reluctance of American courts to enforce commercial
32
Congress sought to hold arbitration
arbitration agreements.
agreements in the same esteem as other contracts, thus overturning
common law decisions holding arbitration clauses revocable at will by
33
either party to a transaction.
The FAA provides that a written
agreement to arbitrate, in any contract involving commerce, shall be
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See infra notes 31-93 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 94-181 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 182-204 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 205-38 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 239-45 and accompanying text.
9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16 (2001).
32. See Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) (noting that courts
hostility to arbitration agreements was a judicial disposition inherited from longstanding English practice); see also Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract
and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. C T. R EV. 331, 351 (1996) (asserting that American courts
disfavored arbitration clauses because they viewed them as devices implemented by
businesses to deprive weaker parties of their rights).
33. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995)
(explaining that, in enacting the FAA, Congress intended the courts to strictly
enforce arbitration agreements and to place such agreements on the same footing as
other contracts).
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 valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
34
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. The Supreme
Court interprets the FAA to require that a challenge to the entire
35
contract be made in arbitration. However, the Court allows for a
36
challenge to only the arbitration clause to be made in federal court.
Because the FAA makes enforceable a written arbitration provision in
a contract involving commerce, the courts have interpreted the FAA
37
to cover almost all consumer contracts.
In the last few decades, the Supreme Court reinterpreted the FAA
evenly more broadly, adopting a pro-arbitration stance.38 In the
landmark case Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
39
Corporation, the Supreme Court announced its  liberal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
40
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary and affirmed a
Court of Appeals decision compelling the arbitration of a contractual
41
dispute regarding the construction of a hospital addition. However,
in a more recent case involving the arbitration of a termite
42
prevention contract, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson, the
Supreme Court effectively erased any state protection of consumers
from mandatory arbitration by declaring that the FAA preempted all

34. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (2001); see also Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract
Doctrine, 32 IND. L. R EV. 1247, 1262 (1999) (noting that generally, legally recognized
grounds for revoking a contract include such doctrines as mistake, duress,
unconscionability and impossibility).
But see Miller, supra note 9, at 305
(commenting that the Supreme Court has yet to define a specific situation where an
exception to the FAA § 2 exists).
35. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04
(1967) (finding that challenges to the validity of the contract as a whole must be
presented to an arbitrator).
36. See id. (holding that the FAA § 4 permits a federal court to hear only
challenges to the validity of the arbitration clause itself).
37. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 277 (interpreting the  involving
commerce provision of the FAA to signal an intent to exercise the full extent of
Congress commerce power).
38. See Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) ( To give effect to [its]
purpose, the FAA compels judicial enforcement of a wide range of written
arbitration agreements. ). But see id. at 1318 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (remarking that
the Courts interpretation of the FAA has given it a scope far beyond the
expectations of Congress).
39. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
40. Id. at 24. Contra Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1437 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(finding the Supreme Courts jurisprudence favoring arbitration inapplicable to a
case in which a consumer cannot afford to arbitrate because it assumes the aggrieved
party can avail him or herself of the arbitral forum).
41. See Moses H. Cone Meml Hosp., 460 U.S. at 29 (affirming the circuit courts
order to arbitrate).
42. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
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43

Finally, in 2000, in Green Tree
state laws disfavoring arbitration.
44
Financial Corp. v. Randolph, the Supreme Court enforced the
arbitration agreement in a contract for the financing of a mobile
home, over the consumers protests that she could not afford to
45
arbitrate.
B. Criticisms of the Supreme Courts Policy on Arbitration
The Supreme Courts increased willingness to endorse arbitration
in so many areas of contract law has been greatly criticized, even by
some members of the Court.46 Many critics of arbitration feel the
drafters of the FAA intended it to apply only to contracts between
business people, and that its extension to consumer contracts is well
47
beyond its intended scope. Other critics are concerned with the
Courts encouragement of arbitration because of the numerous
48
Such
inequities between the arbitral and judicial processes.
inequities not only limit a consumers important rights, but
49
contradict the very notion of freedom of contract.
When a consumer is forced to arbitrate, rather than litigate a claim
against a business entity, that consumer almost always loses the right
50
to a judge and a jury. In addition, arbitration proceedings allow for
51
limited discovery and give the parties limited, if any, right to appeal.
Further, arbitration rules bar the public from accessing the
proceeding and provide for little or no precedential value because
52
the results of arbitration are generally sealed. One of the most
43. See id. at 281 (holding state anti-arbitration policy in direct contradiction to
the language of the FAA and congressional intent).
44. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
45. See id. at 90 (finding it too speculative that the consumer would face
prohibitive costs if forced to arbitrate).
46. See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 131-32 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court for pushing the pendulum far beyond a neutral
attitude of arbitration by endorsing a policy that strongly favors arbitration).
47. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 32, at 386 (asserting that the drafters of
the FAA envisioned it to apply only to commercial agreements between businesses).
48. See id. at 332 (suggesting that the Courts encouragement of private dispute
resolution  disregard[s] [the] serious risks of injustice and lawlessness [that attend]
the enforcement of [arbitration] provisions. ).
49. See generally Threedy, supra note 34, at 1259 (proclaiming that a fundamental
notion of modern freedom of contract doctrine is that competent, autonomous
individuals are entitled to enter into freely chosen obligations).
50. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(observing that an arbitration agreements waiver of a jury trial is absolute).
51. See Miller, supra note 9, at 303 (noting that in addition to limited right to
appeal, arbitration rules provide such limited discovery that under expedited
procedures parties exchange exhibits merely two days before the arbitral hearing).
52. See id. (arguing that because arbitration proceedings are typically private,

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2002

7

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 8
SCARPINO_FINAL2

686

7/17/02 4:58 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL P OLICY & THE L AW [Vol. 10:3

troubling aspects of arbitration is that arbitrators are not necessarily
bound to follow judicial precedent when making a binding, non53
appealable decision whether for or against a consumer.
Because there is no jury to sympathize with consumers who have
fallen victim to a business entity, many commentators argue that
consumers who are forced to arbitrate may be far less likely to win
54
their cases in arbitration than in court. One consumer lawyer warns
consumers forced to arbitrate that their chances of winning in
55
arbitration are far less than their chances of winning in court. In
56
fact, arbitrators need not have a law degree, and because many
57
arbitrators have a business background, they may be more likely to
58
favor a business entity over a consumer. In addition, arbitrators may
59
not be able to properly and justly decide complex legal issues. As a
result, fewer lawyers are willing to take consumer disputes to
60
arbitration. Finally, because arbitration precludes litigation and can
cost significantly more than litigation, it may be financially impossible
they fail to provide a warning to consumers of bad business practices).
53. See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. R EV. 668, 678 (1986) (remarking that arbitrators need not follow legislative
nor agency-mandated standards, and are not required to explain why they may have
strayed from the rule of law).
54. See Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consumers-R-Us: A Reality in the U.C.C. Article 2
Revision Process, 35 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 1593, 1616 (1994) (noting that access to a
jury may be the difference between winning and losing a case). But see Anne
Brafford, Note, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or Trap for
the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. C ORP . L. 331, 358 (1996) (arguing that arbitration awards
are fairly similar to identical verdicts rendered in court, but admitting that lack of
data has hampered attempts to accurately compare the two processes).
55. See Mayer, supra note 8, at A1 (reporting that one consumer lawyer who
usually wins consumer disputes in court has never won one in arbitration and now
advises clients that their chances of winning in arbitration are no better than 50-50).
56. See A M. A RBITRATION A SSN , QUALIFICATION C RITERIA FOR A DMITTANCE TO THE
A MERICAN A RBITRATION A SSOCIATION S N ATIONAL R OSTER OF A RBITRATORS AND
MEDIATORS (2000) (requiring that an arbitrator only have an  educational degree(s)
and/or professional license(s) appropriate to [his or her] field of expertise ),
available at http://www.adr.org/roster/qualifications.html.
57. See A M. A RBITRATION A SSN , N ATIONAL R OSTER OF A RBITRATORS AND MEDIATORS
(2001) (proclaiming that the Associations roster of arbitrators includes the most
accomplished and respected experts from the business community), at
http://www.adr.org/roster/roster_info. html.
58. See Miller, supra note 9, at 303 (remarking that because a far larger
percentage of arbitrators have business backgrounds than do the typical juror, an
arbitrator is more likely than a jury to favor a business defendant).
59. See Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(questioning an arbitrators competence to analyze and decide legal issues without
legal training).
60. See Mayer, supra note 8, at A1 (noting that because of a consumers poor
chances of winning, many consumer lawyers are no longer willing to take consumer
arbitration cases on a contingency-fee basis).
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61

for some consumers to seek relief.
Despite the fact that consumers arguably lose significant rights
when forced to arbitrate, courts have consistently enforced
62
mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer and other contracts. In
doing so, courts have consistently discounted arguments such as
potential bias of arbitrators, deficient discovery provisions and lack of
publicity surrounding arbitration proceedings, holding that such
63
arguments contradict the courts pro-arbitration policy. The courts
rationale for enforcing arbitration is that every party has a duty to
read the contract into which he or she enters, regardless of whether
64
he or she actually read or understood its terms. Therefore, instead
65
of helping reach ADRs goal of  providing equal justice to all, the
courts enforcement of mandatory arbitration leaves low-income
consumers unable to file complaints in court or participate in
arbitration and insulates businesses from claims by low-income
66
consumers. Following the Supreme Courts pro-arbitration policy,
lower courts have shown their reluctance to void an arbitration
agreement even where a consumer could not afford to pay the
67
arbitration fees. As a result, many consumer protection groups and
61. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)
(conceding that high costs of arbitration may preclude low-income litigants from
vindicating their claims in the arbitral forum); see also Miller, supra note 9, at 305
(arguing that cost alone may make mandatory arbitration substantively
unconscionable).
62. See infra Part II.A.
63. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1991)
(rejecting challenges to the adequacy of arbitration); see also Green Tree, 531 U.S. at
80-81 (enforcing the Gilmer standard that federal statutory claims can be
appropriately resolved through arbitration); Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426,
1435-36 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (rejecting consumers argument that arbitration would
result in the loss of important rights because such an argument, since Gilmer, had
been  routinely rejected by federal courts as grounds for invalidating an arbitration
clause ).
64. See A.P. Brown Co. v. Superior Court, 490 P.2d 867, 869 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971)
(holding that a party cannot escape a contractual obligation to arbitrate by claiming
he or she had not read the arbitration clause); see also Larrys United Super, Inc. v.
Werries, 253 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding parties duty to read
documents they sign over a partys claim of ignorance of the arbitration clause). See
generally Carrington & Haagen, supra note 32, at 341 (asserting that while most
consumers realize that the small print in a contract is binding, they seldom read it).
65. See Edwards, supra note 53, at 684 ( [W]e must remember that the
overarching goal of alternative dispute resolution is to provide equal justice to all. ).
66. See Mayer, supra note 8, at A1 (arguing that consumers who cannot file in
court and cannot afford arbitration are  priced out of arbitration).
67. See, e.g., N. Am. Van Lines v. Collyer, 616 So. 2d 177, 178-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that the consumers inability to pay for arbitration did not
excuse them from the terms of their contract, including the agreement to arbitrate);
see also Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(directing parties to substitute an overseas arbitration forum for a less expensive
domestic forum rather than invalidate the arbitration clause completely).
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government agencies have spoken out against mandatory arbitration
68
for consumer conflicts. Some critics of arbitration even argue that
arbitration infringes upon the civil liberties of low-income consumers
69
and other disadvantaged groups.
C. The Rules and Costs of Arbitration
Today, two prominent, private arbitration groups, the American
Arbitration Association ( AAA ) and the National Arbitration Forum
( NAF ), promulgate the rules of the majority of arbitration
agreements the courts enforce under the FAA.70 As the use of
71
arbitration for consumer disputes increases, the number of claims
72
filed at each of the two major arbitration organizations rises. Both
the AAA and NAF have procedural rules governing every aspect of
their arbitration proceedings, including the payment of
73
administrative and other fees. The typical arbitration clause in a
consumer contract may merely reference the rules of the AAA or
NAF, but may not include any information on the costs of arbitration,
74
or how those costs are apportioned between the parties. Thus, the
average consumer may not be on notice that he or she will be
responsible for a substantial portion of the arbitration fees if he or
75
she wishes to bring a claim relating to his or her contract.
68. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 8, at A1 (noting that Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice launched a campaign against mandatory arbitration in 1999 and regulators at
both the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Trade Commission have begun
looking at arbitration clauses because they fear consumers lose significant rights
when forced to arbitrate).
69. See Edwards, supra note 53, at 668-69 (suggesting that arbitration limits the
work of the courts in areas affecting minority interests, civil rights and civil liberties).
70. See Mayer, supra note 8, at A1 (noting that the AAA is the nations largest and
oldest arbitration organization, while the Minneapolis-based NAF is another major
arbitration provider).
71. See Flood, supra note 10, at 21 (reporting that the use of arbitration in
business-to-consumer contracts has burgeoned in the last decade).
72. See generally Mayer, supra note 8, at A1 (noting that more than 95,000
arbitration claims were filed at the AAA in 1998, up twenty percent since 1997).
73. See generally A M. A RBITRATION A SSN , C OMMERCIAL A RBITRATION R ULES (2000)
[hereinafter AAA C OMMERCIAL R ULES] (setting forth the AAAs fifty-six rules
governing commercial arbitration, from initiation of the procedure to suspension for
nonpayment), available at http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial/AAA235-0900.htm;
see also N ATL A RBITRATION FORUM, C ODE OF P ROCEDURE (2001) [hereinafter NAF
R ULES] (listing the NAFs forty-eight rules for arbitration), available at
http://www.arbitration-forum.com.
74. See generally Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(discussing an arbitration clause that incorporated the AAA rules, but did not
explain them).
75. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000)
(enforcing an arbitration clause despite the fact that it was silent with respect to the
costs associated with arbitration and did not articulate which groups arbitration
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Both the AAAs and the NAFs arbitration fees include
administrative filing fees, compensation for the arbitrator, and
general expenses for the arbitration, which may include the
arbitrators travel expenses and the cost of renting a hearing room.76
The initial fee for filing a claim of $10,000 to $75,000 is $750, with
additional filing fees required by any party subsequently filing a
77
counterclaim or an additional claim. The greater the consumers
claim against a business entity, the more he or she must pay to file the
78
claim. In addition to filing fees, the parties must advance their
79
share of the arbitrators fees, which can be as much as $1,600 a day
80
81
for one arbitrator, and much more for a panel of three arbitrators.
Parties may not have any control over the number of arbitrators
appointed to oversee their case or the corresponding amount they
82
Finally, arbitrators only
are required to pay for the arbitrators.
award the prevailing party attorneys fees if specifically allowed for in
83
the parties contract.
rules would govern the arbitration proceeding).
76. See AAA, C OMMERCIAL R ULES, R. 51-53 (listing expected arbitration costs,
including administrative fees, expenses and arbitrator compensation), available at
http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial/ AAA235-0900.htm; see also NAF R ULES, FEE
SCHEDULE (2001) (requiring parties to pay filing fees, administrative fees, document
request fees, and hearing fees, including arbitrator compensation), at
http://www.arbitration-forum.com.
77. See AAA, C OMMERCIAL R ULES (requiring an administrative fee of $1,250 for
claims of $75,000-150,000 in addition to a  case service fee of $750), available at
http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial/AAA235-0900.htm; see also NAF R ULES
(noting that for claims above $15,000, parties must pay a filing fee of $150 plus one
percent of excess over $15,000), at http://www.arbitration-forum.com. But see AAA,
A RBITRATION R ULES FOR THE R ESOLUTION OF C ONSUMER-R ELATED DISPUTES (2001)
[hereinafter AAA, CONSUMER R ULES] (noting that, per the AAAs new consumer
rules, which govern only claims under $10,000 for goods or services intended for
personal, familial, or household use, the business, whether or not it initiates
at
arbitration,
is
responsible
for
the
$500
filing
fee),
http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial/consumer_disputes.html.
78. See AAA, C OMMERCIAL R ULES (recording the filing and case service fees for
claims of $150,000-300,000 as $3,750, while fees for claims of $1,000,000-7,000,000
increase to $11,000), available at http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial/AAA2350900.htm.
79. See AAA, C OMMERCIAL R ULES, R. 54 (requiring parties to deposit in advance
the money the AAA deems necessary to cover the expense of arbitration, including
the arbitrators fee), available at http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial/AAA2350900. htm.
80. See Mayer, supra note 8, at A1 (reporting that, in 1999, arbitrators fees
ranged from $600 to $1,600 a day).
81. See Flood, supra note 10, at 21 (recounting an international arbitration case
in which a consumer had to pay a panel of three arbitrators $500 an hour each).
82. See AAA, C OMMERCIAL R ULES, R. 17 (explaining that the AAA may, in its
discretion, direct and appoint a panel of three arbitrators to oversee any dispute),
available at http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial/AAA235-0900.htm.
83. See Miller, supra note 9, at 304 (indicating that the AAA advises its arbitrators
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In comparison to the high cost of arbitration, the current cost of
filing a complaint in a federal district court is $150.84 Although a lowincome consumer litigating a claim would be able to file in forma
85
pauperis to waive a courts filing fees, a consumer forced to arbitrate
may have a more difficult time obtaining a waiver of arbitration fees,
86
as there is no clear-cut procedure for doing so. In a typical civil suit,
87
litigants are never asked to pay the judges salary or expenses.
The AAA and the NAF have minimal provisions for the waiver of
88
certain, but not all, arbitration fees. A problem therefore arises
when consumers who do not necessarily qualify as indigent
nonetheless are unable to afford the large filing and other fees
89
associated with mandatory arbitration. While arbitrators fees are
generally paid by the employer in an employment arbitration case,
the same is not true of a business in the consumer arbitration
90
forum.
The high cost of mandatory arbitration, because it weighs
significantly against the average consumer, is unconscionable for
that they cannot award attorneys fees unless the parties agreed to as much in their
contract).
84. See Federal Judiciary Homepage (stating that the filing fee for a party
initiating a civil action in a district court is $150), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2002).
85. See id. (noting that complaints filed in federal court may be accompanied by
an application to proceed in forma pauperis if the plaintiff is incapable of paying the
filing fee).
86. See Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1439 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (noting that
the AAAs rules do not contain any procedure for a claimant seeking a reduction in
fees, nor the criteria the AAA employs to determine the extent of such a reduction);
see also Carrington & Haagen, supra note 32, at 384 (noting that a low-income
consumer is not invited to proceed in forma pauperis in AAA arbitration).
87. See Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
( [W]e are unaware of any situation in American jurisprudence in which a
beneficiary of a federal statute has been required to pay for the services of the judge
assigned to hear her or his case. ).
88. See AAA, C OMMERCIAL R ULES, R. 51 (noting that the AAA may, in the event of
extreme hardship on the part of either party, defer or reduce the administrative fees,
but
not
the
arbitrators
fees
or
other
expenses),
available
at
http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial/AAA235-0900.htm; see also NAF R ULES, R. 44
(allowing an indigent party to request a waiver of certain fees, through an affidavit of
indigency stating the partys family size, income, property, assets, expenses, liabilities
and debts, and  all other relevant information ), available at http://www.arbitrationforum.com.
89. See Rosmarin, supra note 54, at 1617 (commenting that even if arbitration
programs had fee waivers for indigent consumers, the issue of cost would still arise
for consumers who may not qualify as indigent, but could not afford the fees).
90. Compare Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(finding that where arbitration is imposed by the employer, arbitrators fees should
be borne solely by the employer), with AAA, C OMMERCIAL R ULES, R. 52 (requiring
parties in a commercial dispute to equally share the costs), available at
http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial/AAA235-0900.htm.
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consumers who cannot afford it because of the lack of choice, terms
unreasonably favorable to the business, unequal bargaining power
91
and unfair terms. Assuming that a party who would qualify in forma
pauperis in federal court would qualify for a fee waiver in arbitration,
if courts required consumers forced to arbitrate to pay only the
administrative fees involved in arbitration, the financial burden on
92
low-income consumers would be substantially lifted. One court has
concluded that the arbitrators fees are the  crucial difference
93
between arbitration and litigation. The following section examines
three consumer cases in which the court refused to find that the cost
of arbitration made an arbitration clause unconscionable.
III. C ASE STUDIES: THE L OW-INCOME C ONSUMER S STRUGGLE A GAINST
MANDATORY A RBITRATION
Taken together, the three consumer cases discussed in this section
provide an excellent overview of the enforcement of mandatory
arbitration of consumer disputes at the state, federal and Supreme
94
Court levels. In the 1993 case North American Van Lines v. Collyer, the
Florida District Court of Appeal denied outright the consumers
95
claim that they could not afford to arbitrate. In the 1998 case Rollins
96
v. Foster, the federal District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama acknowledged that cost might preclude low-income
97
consumers from vindicating their claims against businesses. Finally,
98
in 2000, in Green Tree Financial Services Corp. v. Randolph, the
Supreme Court determined that arbitration could be cost prohibitive
99
to low-income consumers. Yet in all three cases, the courts required

91. See generally Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1434 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(describing the four factors used to determine whether a contract provision, such as
an arbitration clause, is unconscionable).
92. See generally Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484 (noting that if the party requiring
arbitration paid the arbitrators salary and other fees, the party forced to arbitrate
would only have to pay the filing fee).
93. See Rollins, 991 F. Supp. at 1439 (explaining that a litigant in state or federal
court is not accountable for the presiding judges salary).
94. 616 So. 2d 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
95. See id. at 178 (requiring consumers to arbitrate, despite their claim that they
could not afford to pay).
96. 991 F. Supp. 1426 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
97. See id. at 1436 (finding unconscionable a contract that required the
consumer, as a party in an inferior bargaining position, to assert her claims in
arbitration rather than in the less expensive judicial arena).
98. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
99. See id. at 522 (concluding that large arbitration costs could preclude a lowincome litigant from effectively resolving his or her claims in arbitration).
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100

the consumer to arbitrate.

A. North American Van Lines v. Collyer
In 1988, James and Patricia Collyer entered into a contract with a
local moving company for the storage of their household items.101
About a year and a half after they signed the initial contract, the
102
Collyers moved from Florida.
After the Collyers called to inquire
about the cost of shipping the goods to their new home, they
received a letter demanding immediate payment for delinquent
103
storage charges. The letter threatened that if the Collyers did not
pay the fees within two weeks, the moving company would sell the
104
Collyers belongings. Shortly thereafter, the moving company sold
the Collyers belongings at a public auction to satisfy late storage
105
charges.
The Collyers filed suit for  damages arising from the contract,
including the disputed storage charges and the sale of the Collyers
106
However, unbeknownst to the Collyers, their
household items.
contract with the moving company contained a clause requiring that
any disputes arising out of the contract be resolved by binding
107
arbitration through the AAA.
On motion by the defendants, the
108
trial court referred the case to arbitration. After the Collyers filed a
motion opposing arbitration because they could not afford to
109
advance the required $2,500 in arbitration fees, the trial court
110
rescinded its order to arbitrate. In so holding, the trial court found
100. See N. Am. Van Lines v. Collyer, 616 So. 2d 177, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(enforcing the arbitration clause in a contract for the storage of goods); Rollins v.
Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1439 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding the arbitration clause in a
contract for exterminating services valid and enforceable); Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90
(compelling arbitration of a dispute arising out of a contract for home financing).
101. N. Am. Van Lines, 616 So. 2d at 179.
102. See id. (recounting that the Collyers moved to England in 1990).
103. See id. (noting that while the Collyers received monthly bills for the storage
charges, they typically paid them only quarterly).
104. See id. at 179-80 (stating that in addition to the threat, the letter contained a
summary of various charges the Collyers owed, several of which the Collyers claimed
were erroneous).
105. See id. at 179 (noting that the moving and storage companies sold the
Collyers belongings on May 7, 1990).
106. N. Am. Van Lines v. Collyer, 616 So. 2d 177, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
107. See id. at 178 (observing that the contract required the parties to settle all
disputes through arbitration governed by the rules of the AAA).
108. Id. at 177.
109. See id. at 178 (indicating that the Collyers asserted that they could not pay,
and the arbitrator would not waive, neither the required filing fee nor the
arbitrators fee). The fees totaled over $2,500. See id. at 180 (Griffin, J., concurring).
110. See N. Am. Van Lines, 616 So. 2d at 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol10/iss3/8

14

Scarpino: Mandatory Arbitration of Consumer Disputes: A Proposal to Ease th
SCARPINO_FINAL2

2002]

7/17/02 4:58 PM

MANDATORY A RBITRATION OF C ONSUMER DISPUTES

693

that while the judicial proceeding was precluded by the contracts
mandatory arbitration clause, the arbitration proceeding was
111
 precluded by [the Collyers] inability to pay the deposit required.
On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
courts finding that the Collyers inability to pay the costs excused
112
113
them from arbitration. Citing American Jurisprudence on Contracts,
the appellate court flatly denied the Collyers claim of inability to pay
as a valid defense to mandatory arbitration and contrary to judicial
114
policy favoring arbitration. By using a general treatise on contracts
115
rather than judicial precedent as the basis for its decision, the court
ignored the fact that standard-form consumer contracts are not
116
contracts that both parties have made or negotiated. The court also
overlooked the fact that even American Jurisprudence specifies that
117
parties must do things that are  possible , and the Collyers asserted
that arbitration was not possible for them because they could neither
118
afford nor obtain waiver of the arbitration fees. Their contract, like
most consumer contracts, was an adhesion contract that gave them
119
no choice, and no warning, of the costs of arbitration. By rejecting
the trial court held the combined effect of the arbitration provision and the AAAs
fee requirement was to deprive the Collyers of any avenue of redress).
111. Id.
112. See id. at 178-79 (holding that the trial court impermissibly rewrote the
contract, given the Collyers  clear and unambiguous agreement to arbitrate, and
inappropriately attempted to make an otherwise valid contract more reasonable for
the Collyers).
113. See id. at 179.
Inconvenience or cost, though they might make compliance [of a contract]
a hardship, cannot excuse a party from performing an absolute and
unqualified undertaking to do a thing that is possible and lawful [and
required by the contract]. . . The rights of the parties must be measured by
the contract which they themselves made.
Id. (citing 12 A M. JUR., Contracts § 362).
114. See N. Am. Van Lines v. Collyer, 616 So. 2d 177, 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that the trial courts result  defies well-established contract law, and is
inherently unfair to other contracting parties ).
115. See id. (quoting 12 A M. JUR ., Contracts § 362). But see Cole v. Burns Intl Sec.
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting that courts should not rely
on even widely respected treatises as the basis for their decisions).
116. See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 12 (1999) (defining a standard-form contract as a
contract of adhesion, prepared by the party of superior bargaining strength and
often involving high-pressure tactics).
117. See 12 A M. JUR ., Contracts § 362 (stating hardship cannot excuse a party from
performing a thing that is possible).
118. See N. Am. Van Lines, 616 So. 2d at 178 (noting that the Collyers challenged
arbitration because they could not pay or obtain waiver of the arbitration fees).
119. See id. at 178 (stating that the arbitration clause required the party initiating
arbitration to advance the fee that the AAA deemed necessary, without giving any
indication as to how great that fee may be, or what level of discretion the AAA would
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the trial courts findings in favor of a standard treatise on contracts,
the court failed to adequately consider the implications of its decision
120
on low-income consumers forced to arbitrate.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Griffin expressed just such
121
Judge Griffin asserted that if the moving company was
concerns.
indeed responsible for the loss of the Collyers personal items, the
Collyers were simply without remedy because they could not afford
122
the only available forum.
Judge Griffin further warned that if the
courts enforced such arbitration clauses, they would force
unsuspecting consumers even those aware of the agreement, but
unaware of the cost to pay thousands of dollars in front-end fees
123
required by the AAA.
Judge Griffin finally noted that by blindly
enforcing arbitration clauses, courts would be failing to truly consider
124
whether a consumer is even able to pay the arbitration fees.
Despite Judge Griffins criticism of the courts analysis and
suggestion that the court locked the Collyers out of the only forum
available to them, Judge Griffin did not pose any alternative
solutions, even as dicta, for low-income consumers forced to
125
In fact, Judge Griffin did not dissent from the majority
arbitrate.
126
opinion requiring the Collyers to arbitrate their claims. By failing
to dissent from the majority holding enforcing the arbitration clause,
Judge Griffin failed to take advantage of an available opportunity to
provide either a true warning to low-income consumers, or a red flag
use in determining the fee); see generally Green, supra note 2, at 113 (asserting that
consumers generally do not appreciate the ramifications of an arbitration clause
because they have not had the option to bargain over the terms of the agreement).
120. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(commenting that arbitrators are less competent than judges to decide legal issues
because arbitrators are more likely to cite to and rely on treatises).
121. See N. Am. Van Lines, 616 So. 2d at 179 (Griffin, J., concurring) (writing
separately to emphasize the danger to the unwary consumer illustrated by the courts
enforcement of the arbitration clause).
122. See id. at 180 (noting that by entering into the storage contract, the Collyers
contractually relinquished their right of access to the courts in favor of a method of
ADR that they could not afford to access).
123. See id. at 180 (observing that the Collyers claim, for $90,000, required a
deposit of $2,350, on top of the $300 filing fee); see generally Carrington & Haagen,
supra note 32, at 384-86 (asserting that consumers are often without warning that
arbitration administrative fees are higher than court filing fees, and that arbitration
costs include the arbitrators  handsome hourly rates).
124. See N. Am. Van Lines, 616 So. 2d at 180 (arguing that it did not seem to matter
to the court at all that the Collyers, unable to pay the arbitration fees, were locked
out of the only forum available to them).
125. See id. at 179 (stating the danger of the case to low-income consumers, yet
failing to offer any alternative findings).
126. See id. (Griffin, J., concurring) (agreeing with the result reached by the
majority, but writing a special concurrence).
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to other courts considering mandatory arbitration agreements in
127
consumer contracts.
B. Rollins v. Foster
128

The district courts decision in Rollins v. Foster illustrates another
denial of a consumers argument that inability to pay for arbitration
129
would leave her unable to resolve her claims against a business. Yet
the Rollins court went one step further than the North American Van
Lines court by acknowledging that there may actually be
circumstances in which such an argument would preclude a court
from enforcing an arbitration clause against a low-income
130
consumer.
The Rollins case began when Judy Foster contacted the Orkin
Exterminating Company to inquire about the cost of spraying her
131
trailer home for cockroaches. When the inspector informed Foster
that her home required treatment that would cost about $38 per
132
The inspector then
month, she ordered three months of service.
prepared a number of forms for Fosters signature, but did not
explain them to her and did not point out to her that the forms had
133
writing on both sides. In fact, the actual contract Foster signed was
drastically different from the terms she had requested and thought
134
she had agreed to. Rather than a three-month service agreement,
the contract established a two-year service relationship for a total cost
135
of $2,200.
Because Foster had limited reading ability, she was unable to
127. See generally Miller, supra note 9, at 303 (noting that judicial decisions can
help warn consumers of bad business practices and discourage businesses from
continuing abuses).
128. 991 F. Supp. 1426 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
129. See id. at 1438 (finding that the consumer failed to prove that forcing her to
pay for arbitration would leave her unable to pursue her claims in either the arbitral
forum or the judicial arena).
130. See id. at 1438-39 (finding that the costs of arbitration may render an
arbitration clause unconscionable in some circumstances).
131. See id. at 1428 (noting that Orkin responded to Fosters call by sending an
inspector to her home).
132. Id.
133. See Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (recounting
that the inspector gave Foster a clipboard upon which he had placed the terms of
their contract).
134. See id. (maintaining that Foster had agreed to three months of service at less
than $40 per month).
135. See id. at 1429 (noting that in addition to the $2,200 service agreement, the
contract established a credit agreement which required Foster to pay interest on the
cost of services in advance of receiving them).
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understand much of the contract she signed with Orkin. Foster was
unaware that the contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause,
which, like the arbitration clauses in many consumer contracts, was
137
printed on the reverse side of the contract.
When Foster realized
138
the extent of the service agreement she had signed, she filed suit
against Orkin and Rollins, Inc. for punitive and compensatory
139
damages arising from the contract.
Shortly thereafter, Orkin and
Rollins filed a petition to remove the case to arbitration, and the
140
Foster contested the courts order
court granted their request.
compelling her to arbitrate, and, like many consumers challenging
mandatory arbitration, claimed the arbitration clause was cost
141
prohibitive and therefore unconscionable.
The court found Fosters claim had merit, and acknowledged that
arbitration could be cost prohibitive to any consumer, like Foster, in
142
The court also realized that if it
an inferior bargaining position.
allowed a business to force its customers to arbitrate and pay the costs
of arbitration, the court would effectively be allowing that business to
143
insulate itself from complaints brought by low-income consumers.
136. See id. at 1428 (stating that Foster had only a ninth grade education).
137. See id. at 1430 (explaining that the arbitration agreement stated that the
parties agreed that all disputes would be resolved by arbitration administered by the
AAA in accordance with its commercial arbitration rules and pursuant to the FAA);
see also Mayer, supra note 8, at A1 (reporting that often, an arbitration clause is
buried in a pile of documents the consumer is asked to sign quickly, or printed on
the back side of a receipt).
138. See Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (noting that
two weeks after her home was inspected, Foster received a payment book from
Orkin). Foster contacted Orkin to question the charges, and attempted to make
monthly payments after Orkin threatened to garnish her wages and damage her
credit report if she didnt comply with the contract terms. See id.
139. See id. (explaining that after Foster filed her complaint in Alabama state
court, Orkin and Rollins removed the proceeding to the Northern District Court of
Alabama).
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1436-37 (noting that Foster essentially contended that because she
could not afford to pay the costs of the arbitration proceeding, she would be left
without a remedy if forced to arbitrate her claims); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Major
Ways of Challenging Arbitration Agreements in the Consumer Setting: Drafting a Bulletproof
Consumer Arbitration Agreement: Is it Possible?, 1102 P RACTICING L. INST. 763, 772-73
(1998) (noting that many consumers have challenged an arbitration agreement on
the grounds of unconscionability with varying degrees of success).
142. See Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
When a party who is in such an inferior bargaining position, as was Foster, is
compelled to assert her claims in arbitration, thus precluding a remedy in
the less expensive public fora, and the costs of the arbitral forum render the
party unable to pursue her claim, the clause is oppressive and one-sided and
therefore unconscionable.
Id.
143. See id. (stating that to force a consumer to arbitrate and pay the costs of
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By answering the  novel question of whether an arbitration clause is
unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, because of a partys
144
inability to pay for the costs of the arbitration proceeding, in the
affirmative, the Rollins court granted a potentially huge victory for
145
low-income consumers throughout Alabama and elsewhere. At the
same time, the potential for victory was completely squashed when
the court, after acknowledging that forcing Foster to arbitrate would
146
be unconscionable, actually proceeded to compel arbitration.
Although the court found that  the costs associated with arbitration
may, in certain circumstances, render an arbitration clause
147
it held that Foster had not sufficiently
unconscionable,
demonstrated that such circumstances existed to preclude arbitration
148
of her claims.
The type of showing a consumer would have to make in order to
sufficiently demonstrate that his or her financial circumstances would
149
After all, the Rollins
make arbitration impossible remain unclear.
court was well aware that Foster was unemployed and had been on
150
The court contended that because
disability for twenty-two years.
she received Social Security and other benefits and owned the trailer
home in which she lived, Foster might have had  other sources of
income or own[ed] other assets besides her trailer home that may
151
have allowed her to pay the costs of arbitration. Despite the courts
arbitration would permit sophisticated business entities to circumvent not only
judicial, but also arbitral proceedings).
144. Id. at 1428.
145. See generally Arbitration Clause Unconscionable if Arbitral Costs are Prohibitive and
Lock-Out Party Forum, 9 WORLD A RB. & MEDIATION R EP . 197, 198 (1998) (describing
Rollins as a decision of interest because it acknowledged that an arbitration clause
that left a party without relief for financial reasons would be unconscionable and
invalid).
146. See Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1439 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding the
arbitration clause valid and enforceable, and compelling arbitration); see also Jeremy
Senderowicz, Consumer Arbitration and Freedom of Contract: A Proposal to Facilitate
Consumers Informed Consent to Arbitration Clauses in Form Contracts, 32 C OLUM. J.L. &
SOC. P ROBS. 275, 294-95 (1999) (citing Rollins as a clear example of the federal
courts policy favoring arbitration because the court required Foster to submit to
arbitration despite the fact that the conduct of the exterminating company was
unconscionable).
147. Rollins, 991 F. Supp. at 1439.
148. See id. (holding that Foster did not sufficiently demonstrate that she was
locked out of arbitration).
149. See id. (stating only that there may exist  certain circumstances in which the
costs of arbitration may make arbitration unconscionable to low-income consumers,
without specifying what those circumstances may be).
150. See id. at 1438 (conceding that  admittedly, Foster has been unemployed for
the past twenty-two years. ).
151. Id.
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knowledge of Fosters meager financial resources, the court
contended that it did not have a full enough picture of her finances
152
to properly evaluate her ability to pay the costs of arbitration.
Rollins left low-income consumers who face high arbitration costs
with an enormously high threshold of proving they cannot afford
arbitration.153 After all, if an unemployed person who lives in a trailer
home and subsists on disability and Social Security benefits is
compelled to arbitrate, who would the court not send to
154
arbitration? Additionally, because the results of Fosters arbitration
are sealed if she indeed went through with arbitration the
155
outcome of her ordeal will remain unknown.
C. Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Randolph
In December 2000, in a case strikingly similar to Rollins v. Foster, the
U.S. Supreme Court confronted the legal problem of a consumer
unable to afford the arbitration process mandated by her service
156
contract. Green Tree was the first consumer arbitration case in which
the Supreme Court considered whether arbitration is cost prohibitive
157
to low-income consumers.
In 1997, Larketta Randolph entered into a contract with Green
Tree Financial Corporation to finance the purchase of her mobile
158
In addition to requiring that Randolph buy insurance to
home.
protect Green Tree from the cost of a potential default, the contract,
like many financing agreements, also required that all disputes be
152. See Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1438-39 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (adding that
in addition to insufficient information about Fosters financial condition, the court
did not have enough information about the cost of arbitrators fees). The court
suggested that if Foster had shown that she could not find an attorney to represent
her because of the expense of the arbitration proceedings, her unconscionability
claim would have been substantially bolstered. See id. at 1439.
153. See id. at 1438 (finding that the disclosure of Fosters employment and living
situations provided insufficient information as to her ability to afford arbitration).
154. See id. at 1438 (noting that Foster had been unemployed for twenty-two years
and survived on government benefits, but contending nonetheless that she had not
provided sufficient proof that she could not afford to arbitrate).
155. See AAA, C OMMERCIAL R ULES, R. 49 (allowing the release of certain arbitration
documents to the parties only in specific instances), available at
http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial/AAA235-0900.htm.
156. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000) (addressing
the question of  whether an arbitration agreement that does not mention costs and
fees is unenforceable because it fails to affirmatively protect a party from potentially
steep arbitration costs ).
157. See generally Sabino, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that because the Supreme
Court considered the Green Tree case, the issue of arbitrations inaccessibility to lowincome consumers now looms on the horizon).
158. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 82-83.
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159

Randolph later sued Green Tree
resolved by binding arbitration.
under the Truth in Lending Act for failing to disclose the insurance
160
requirement, and for requiring her to arbitrate. The district court
granted Green Trees motion to compel arbitration and denied
Randolphs request for reconsideration, in which she argued that she
161
was unable to afford arbitration.
The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding the arbitration agreement
unenforceable because of its silence with respect to the costs involved
162
in arbitration.
163
In a 5-4 decision delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court overturned the Eleventh Circuits decision, and ruled
that an arbitration agreements silence on the costs of arbitration did
164
In addressing Randolphs claims that the
not render it unlawful.
excessive cost of arbitration would require her to forego her claims
against Green Tree, the Supreme Court stated,  It may well be that
the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such
as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights
in the arbitral forum. 165 However, the Court continued by stating
that the risk that Randolph would be bombarded with prohibitive
costs was just  too speculative to justify invalidating the arbitration
166
agreement.
Like the federal district court in Rollins, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that arbitration costs could be prohibitive to low159. See id. (stating that the contract required that all disputes arising under case
law, statutory law, contract, tort or property law be resolved by arbitration); see also
Shelly Smith, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer
Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEP AUL L. R EV. 1191, 1192
(2001) (reporting that arbitration clauses commonly appear in loan, mortgage or
other financing agreements).
160. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 83 (noting that Randolph originally sued Green
Tree under the Truth in Lending Act, but later added a claim under the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, which she claimed Green Tree violated by requiring her to
arbitrate).
161. See id. (noting that, in addition to compelling arbitration and denying
Randolphs request for reconsideration, the district court also dismissed Randolphs
claims with prejudice and denied her request for class certification).
162. See id. at 84 (holding the agreement unenforceable because it posed a risk
that Randolphs ability to vindicate her statutory rights would be precluded by high
arbitration costs).
163. See id. at 81 (noting that Justices OConnor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas
joined in the denial of Randolphs claim).
164. See id. at 91 (holding that the arbitration agreements silence as to cost was
 plainly insufficient to render it unenforceable ).
165. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
166. See id. at 92 (concluding that Randolphs claim that she did not have the
resources to arbitrate did not provide the Court with a sufficient basis for finding
that arbitration would be cost prohibitive to her).
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income consumers, yet it still required the consumer seeking to
167
In addition, the Green Tree
invalidate the agreement to arbitrate.
court, like the court in Rollins, provided little insight into what kind
of showing a consumer would have to make to prove that mandatory
168
arbitration would lock him or her out of the judicial process.
169
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, more closely addressed
the issue of accessibility of the arbitral forum to low-income
consumers.170 In an opinion that criticized the Court for combining
171
the issues of adequacy and accessibility of the arbitral forum, Justice
Ginsburg questioned the Courts pronouncement that the burden of
172
Justice
proving arbitration inaccessible should lie with Randolph.
Ginsburg argued that, because the contract was silent on the costs
173
and type of arbitration mandated, Randolph should not have been
174
required to arbitrate without knowing how much it would cost her.
Further, Justice Ginsburg asserted that even requiring Randolph to
pay the costs of arbitration gave Green Tree an unfair advantage in
175
the arbitration process. She also suggested that if Green Tree were
167. See id. (ordering arbitration over Randolphs claim that it would be
prohibitively expensive); see also Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1439 (M.D. Ala.
1998) (granting Rollins and Orkins petition to compel arbitration despite Fosters
argument that she could not afford arbitration).
168. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92 (requiring that a party seeking to invalidate an
arbitration agreement on grounds of cost bear the burden of proving the likelihood
of incurring such costs, without discussing  how detailed a showing of prohibitive
expense must be before a party seeking arbitration must come forward with contrary
evidence ). But see Smith, supra note 159, at 1242 (arguing that as a result of Green
Tree, a consumer should be able to successfully raise prohibitive cost as a reason to
invalidate an arbitration clause so long as he or she can prove which arbitration
forum will be used, and the actual costs of that forum).
169. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92 (stating that Justices Stevens, Souter, and in part,
Justice Breyer, joined in Justice Ginsburgs dissent).
170. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that she would  vacate the Eleventh
Circuits decision, which declared the arbitration clause unenforceable, and remand
the case for closer consideration of the arbitral forums accessibility ).
171. See id. (criticizing the Court for blending two discrete inquiries: the adequacy
of the forum to adjudicate the claims at issue, and the forums accessibility to
Randolph).
172. See id. at 94 (arguing that it does not follow that the party resisting arbitration
should also bear the burden of showing that the arbitral forum would be financially
inaccessible).
173. See id. at 94 (noting that Randolphs form contract provided no indication of
the rules under which arbitration would proceed, or the costs she would likely
incur). Justice Ginsburg suggested that Green Tree could have filled that void
merely by specifying that arbitration would be governed by the AAA. See Green Tree
Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 94 (2000).
174. See id. at 96 (stating that  it is hardly clear that Randolph should bear the
burden of demonstrating up front the arbitral forums inaccessibility, or that she
should be required to submit to arbitration without knowing how much it will cost
her ).
175. See id. (asserting that  as a repeat player in the arbitration required by its
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required to cover the costs of arbitration, as employers are in
employment disputes in arbitration, Randolph would have been
176
By merely bringing the issue of
insulated from prohibitive costs.
cost to the forefront, the Green Tree decision seems to have potential
as the basis for future consumer disputes, despite its disagreeable
177
result for the consumer involved.
Because the majority explicitly
stated that large arbitration costs could preclude low-income
178
consumers from litigating their claims  even though it found that
179
Randolph had not individually proved as much in her situation  it
left the issue open for future consumer disputes. If the Court were
confronted with the issue in a situation where the consumer made a
detailed showing of the administrative, hearing, arbitrators fees and
other costs involved in the arbitral forum that are not generally
waived, as well as a detailed personal financial record reflecting his or
180
her inability to pay those costs none of which Randolph did  the
Court would likely find that such a consumer would be precluded
181
from vindicating his or her rights.
IV. P ROPOSAL : MAKING A RBITRATION MORE A CCESSIBLE TO L OWINCOME C ONSUMERS
The three cases previously discussed strongly contrast the
182
employment case Cole v. Burns Intl Security Services, in which the
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia found it unfair to require

form contract, Green Tree has superior information about the cost to consumers of
pursuing arbitration ).
176. See id. at 96 (stating that if Green Trees practice under the form contract
resembled that of the employment contract in Gilmer, in which the employer covered
the costs of arbitration, the arbitral forum would have been accessible to Randolph);
see also Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding
that the cost of arbitration was not in dispute in Gilmer, because in the securities
industry, employers routinely paid all arbitrators fees).
177. See Sabino, supra note 3, at 1 (describing Justice Ginsburgs dissent as a
 harbinger of the future for its discussion of the issue of financial inaccessibility of
arbitration).
178. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90.
179. See id. (finding that the record did not show that Randolph would bear
prohibitive costs if forced to arbitrate).
180. See id. (noting that Randolph failed to support her assertion that  arbitration
costs are high with any factual proof). Instead, Randolph merely attached
informational material from the AAA that did not discuss filing fees, and quoted a
news article which cited $700 per day as the average arbitral fee. See id.
181. See Smith, supra note 159, at 1242 (suggesting that because of Green Tree, a
consumer could successfully show arbitration is cost-prohibitive so long as he or she
can prove the actual costs involved in the arbitral forum).
182. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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183

an employee forced to arbitrate to also pay the costs of arbitration.
The Cole courts analysis of arbitration costs is directly applicable to
North American Van Lines, Rollins and Green Tree, and should become
the court-imposed standard for the arbitration of all consumer
arbitration disputes.184
A. Cole v. Burns International Security Services

Clinton Cole worked as a security guard at Union Station in
185
His employer, Burns International Security
Washington, D.C.
Services ( Burns Security ), required all employees to sign a pre186
dispute arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. The
agreement stated that in the event that Cole sought relief from a
dispute arising out of his employment contract, he would be required
187
to file a claim in arbitration.
Two years after he signed the
188
arbitration agreement, Burns Security fired Cole.
Cole filed a
complaint against Burns Security, alleging, in part, racial
discrimination, racial harassment and intentional infliction of
189
emotional distress.
Burns Security moved to both dismiss Coles
complaint and compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of Coles
190
The district court found the arbitration
employment contract.
agreement covered Coles claims, and compelled the parties to
191
arbitrate.
Cole appealed the district courts ruling enforcing the
192
arbitration agreement.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that
183. See id. at 1485 (holding that an employer could not require an employee to
arbitrate any future claims against his or her employer as a condition of employment,
when the agreement required the employee to pay all or part of the arbitration
expenses).
184. See infra Parts IV.B and IV.C.
185. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1469 (noting that the security company Cole initially
worked for at Union Station was LaSalle and Partners).
186. See id. (stating that Burns Security took over LaSalles contract to provide
security at Union Station, and required all LaSalle employees, including Cole, to sign
an arbitration agreement in order to obtain employment with Burns Security).
187. See id. at 1469 (noting that the agreement required Cole, in the event of a
dispute, to waive his right to trial by jury in favor of arbitration governed by the
AAA).
188. See id. (recounting that Cole signed the arbitration agreement in August
1991, and Burns Security fired Cole in October 1993).
189. See id. at 1469-70 (noting that after filing charges at the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Cole filed a complaint at the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia).
190. Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
191. See id. (noting that, in compelling arbitration, the district court rejected
Coles claim that the agreement was an unenforceable contract of adhesion).
192. Id. at 1467.
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the disputed arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable, but
193
The court found the cost distribution
reserved one major caveat.
required by the arbitration agreement was unfair to Cole, and
required Burns Security to pay the full amount of the arbitrators fees
194
and expenses.
More generally, the court held that an employer
could not condition the acceptance of employment on the signing of
an arbitration agreement that required the employee to pay all or
195
even part of the arbitrators fees.
Noting that the AAAs employment rules gave no indication of
whether an arbitrators fees would be reduced or waived in the event
of financial hardship,196 the court found that Cole, if required to pay
the fees, would be unlikely to pursue his claims against Burns
197
The court acknowledged that an arbitrators fees would
Security.
be a prohibitive expense for Cole, especially after losing his job, and
concluded that it would be  unacceptable to require Cole to pay the
198
arbitrators fees because they were  unlike anything he would have
199
to pay to pursue his statutory claims in court. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recounted that  arbitration is
200
supposed to be a reasonable substitute for a judicial forum, but
193. See id. at 1483 ( Although we find that the disputed arbitration agreement is
legally valid, there is one point that requires amplification. ).
194. See id. at 1485 (holding that regardless of whether the rules required Cole to
pay all or even half of the arbitrators fees, an arbitrators compensation and
expenses must be paid by the employer alone).
195. See Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(answering the question  can an employer require an employee to arbitrate all
disputes and also require the employee to pay all or part of the arbitrators fees?,
with the statement  We hold that it cannot ).
196. See id. at 1484 (stating that the AAAs rules were silent on waivers for the
arbitrators fees).
197. See id. (stating that if an employee like Cole were required to pay arbitrators
fees ranging from $500-$1,000 per day or more in addition to administrative and
attorneys fees, he would unlikely be unable to pursue his claims); see also AAA,
N ATIONAL R ULES FOR THE R ESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES, R. 38 (2001) (noting
that the AAA, in the event of extreme hardship, may defer or reduce administrative
fees, without noting whether the AAA would defer or reduce other arbitration fees),
available at http://www.adr.org/ rules/employment/employment_rules2.html.
198. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484 (noting that because Cole did not challenge the
administrative fees charged by the AAA, the Court would not address whether the
AAAs refusal to waive filing and other administrative fees could preclude
enforcement of the arbitration agreement). Rather, the court assumed, for purposes
of the case, that employees who would qualify in forma pauperis status in a federal
court would similarly qualify for a waiver of administrative fees under the AAAs
rules. See id.
199. See id. (finding that arbitration under the AAA would require Cole to pay a
$500 filing fee, compared to the $120 filing fee required by the district court). In
addition, arbitration would require the parties to compensate the arbitrator, whereas
they would  never be required to pay for a judge in court. Id.
200. Id.
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recognized that requiring an employee to pay the excessive costs of
201
arbitration would undermine that idea.
In enforcing the arbitration agreement, the Cole court denied that
requiring only the employer to pay the arbitrators fees would be
202
On the contrary, the court noted that
unfair to the employer.
requiring the employer to pay the arbitrators fees was only fair, since
it was the employer, Burns Security, who mandated arbitration as a
203
condition of Coles employment.
In addition, the court pointed
with approval to several circumstances in which an employer is either
required to pay the arbitrators fees, or voluntarily agrees to bear the
204
costs.
B. Applying Cole To Consumer Arbitration Cases
The arguments the court set forth in Cole205 apply equally to
consumer disputes, and the Supreme Courts decision in Green Tree
206
The Cole court found that mandatory
does not change this.
arbitration agreements in individual employees contracts are often
presented on a  take-it-or-leave-it basis, and must be signed as a
207
condition of employment.
The same is true of mandatory
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts, which a consumer
often must sign as a condition for the receipt of goods or services at

201. See Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(stating that it would undermine Congresss intent in enacting the FAA if employees
who were seeking to vindicate their rights were shut out from the judicial forum and
required to pay for the services of an arbitrator).
202. See id. at 1484 (rejecting concerns that it would be  perversion of the
arbitration process to have only one party pay the arbitrators fees).
203. See id. (noting that absent the required arbitration clause, Cole would have
been free to pursue his claims in court without having to pay for the services of a
judge).
204. See id. at 1484 (noting that arbitrators fees are never an issue in securities
cases, because under NYSE and NASD Rules, it is standard practice for employers to
pay all of the arbitrators fees). For additional support, the Cole Court quoted a
director of industrial relations at a major defense firm who explained that his
company bears the cost of the arbitrators fees for the practical reason that most of
the employees who seek arbitration of their grievances simply could not afford to
arbitrate if the company did not. See id. at 1484-85.
205. See Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(deciding whether and to what extent a person can be required, as a condition of
employment, to waive all rights to a trial by jury in the event of a dispute, and sign an
arbitration agreement requiring him or her to pay arbitration costs).
206. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (finding that
the consumer challenging arbitration had not sufficiently proven it was cost
prohibitive, but acknowledging that the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude low-income litigants from vindicating their rights in the arbitral forum).
207. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1477 (finding that employees often have no choice but to
sign an employment contract that contains a clause requiring arbitration).
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208

issue. While it was not discussed in North American Van Lines, Rollins
or Green Tree, there is little doubt that the consumers in those cases
would not have received the services they desired had they not signed
209
the contracts that included the arbitration clauses. Therefore, the
two situations are similar.
Additionally, the Cole court found that, because there is often no
union to negotiate the terms of an individual employees arbitration
agreement, employers are able to structure arbitration in a way that
disadvantages employees.210 Similarly, because there is no union to
negotiate the terms of an arbitration agreement for a consumer
211
212
seeking to store some furniture, obtain extermination services, or
213
arrange for financing on the purchase of a home, businesses, too,
are able to structure arbitration in a way that significantly
214
Because the Collyers, Foster and
disadvantages consumers.
Randolph all needed the services for which they signed contracts, and
were unaware that the arbitration clause was present in their
contracts, it is unlikely that any of them could or would have
negotiated or hired a lawyer or consumer protection group to
215
negotiate the arbitration clause.
The Cole court concluded that it would be unacceptable to require
an employee to pay an arbitrators fees because there were no such
208. See generally Smith, supra note 159, at 1192 (reporting that companies often
require consumers to agree to an arbitration clause before the company will conduct
business with them).
209. See N. Am. Van Lines v. Collyer, 616 So. 2d 177, 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(describing the contract at issue as a form contract with a standard provision
requiring arbitration of future disputes, thereby inferring that there was little or no
room for negotiation); Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1429 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(observing that the arbitration clause was pre-printed on the contract in controversy,
which required a signature in exchange for the requested services); Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82-83 (stating that the contract in dispute required
the consumer to sign the arbitration agreement in order to receive financing).
210. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1477 (citing Alfred W. Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary
Arbitration of Individual Employment Disputes, 16 U. MICH. J.L. R EFORM 249, 254-55
(1983)) (arguing that because  the employer and its lawyers have a comparatively
free hand in drafting the details of an arbitration clause . . . some employers may
seek to unfairly narrow the legal rights of employees in the arbitration clause. ).
211. See generally N. Am. Van Lines, 616 So. 2d at 179 (describing a contract for the
transportation and storage of a familys household items).
212. See generally Rollins, 991 F. Supp. at 1428 (involving a contract for
exterminating services).
213. See generally Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 82-83 (discussing a contract for financing
the purchase of a mobile home).
214. See Smith, supra note 159, at 1192 (asserting that arbitration clauses are
typically drafted by sophisticated attorneys employed by large companies, and
imposed without notice to the consumers who sign the contracts).
215. See id. (observing that normally consumers do not seek legal advice before
entering contracts for basic goods or services).
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comparable fees required in litigation. Similarly, it is unacceptable
to require a consumer to pay an arbitrators fees; because, like
employment or any other type of dispute, no such fees are required
217
for a consumer to pursue his or her claims in court. If neither an
employee nor a consumer is responsible for paying for the room in
which to hold the hearing or trial, the court reporter, the clerk and
218
the judges salary when litigating, neither should be required to do
so when arbitrating. After all, as the Cole court noted, requiring an
employee to pay excessive arbitration fees undermines the idea that
219
arbitration is a reasonable substitute for litigation. Additionally, as
the Rollins court noted, those extra fees represent the  crucial
220
difference between arbitration and litigation.
Rather than set an arbitrary threshold or standard of proof for a
221
consumer to prove he or she cannot afford to arbitrate, the courts
should create a rule applying the Cole holding and make it standard
practice for businesses to pay for arbitration fees other than
administrative fees, which low-income consumers, if they cannot pay,
can apply for waiver, as they would in court. A court-created rule
would not undermine the holding in Green Tree requiring arbitration;
rather, it would continue the courts pro-arbitration policy but clarify
the implications for both businesses and consumers.
C. Other Recommendations for Consumer Arbitration
While some commentators may argue that consumer and
employment contracts are too different to have the same result

216. See Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(invalidating the AAAs rule requiring parties to share the expenses of arbitration,
including the arbitrators fees, and finding instead that the employer must cover all
such costs).
217. See Rollins, 991 F. Supp. at 1439 (noting that a litigant in state or federal court
is not accountable for the presiding judges salary).
218. See Scheff, supra note 15, at 11 (stating that litigating parties are not required
to pay any of these items, while arbitrating parties must cover the cost of all of them).
219. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484 (finding that it would undermine Congressional
intent to prevent employees from gaining access to a judicial forum and then require
them to pay for services they would never be required to pay in court).
220. See Rollins, 991 F. Supp. at 1439 (finding that arbitrators fees represent the
crucial difference between arbitration and litigation, because a litigant is not
accountable for the judges salary, while a party arbitrating must compensate the
arbitrator).
221. See generally id. (noting that there may be circumstances in which a party
could prove he or she could not afford to arbitrate, without setting forth what those
circumstances would be); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 9091 (2000) (declining to discuss how detailed a showing a party would have to make to
show that arbitration was cost prohibitive).
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222

apply, such arguments disregard the numerous similarities between
the two types of contracts, like the unequal footing of the parties and
corresponding lack of bargaining power of both the consumer and
223
the employee. The idea that employees may have more bargaining
power in negotiating their employment contracts than consumers
224
negotiating the purchase of goods or services disregards the idea
that both the employer and the business draft the contract and can
therefore condition acceptance of the offer on the agreement of all
225
of the contract terms, without room for negotiation.
To suggest
that an employee has more choice than a consumer is to ignore the
fact that increasing numbers of employers and businesses are
226
including arbitration agreements in their contracts.
Such an argument also discounts the reality of the situation: that
neither employees nor consumers are likely to begin a relationship
with their employer or a local business by discussing the possibility of
227
future disputes. In addition, neither an employee nor a consumer
is likely to challenge an arbitration clause if he or she does not
228
understand what it entails. Similarly, arguments that it is unfair to
222. See, e.g., Mclaughlin, supra note 13, at 916-22 (analyzing separately
employment and consumer arbitration agreements, because consumer claims
present a  special problem in arbitrability ).
223. See, e.g., Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage
Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 A RIZ. L. R EV. 1039, 1052 (1998) (commenting
that the traditional reasons for parties agreeing to arbitrate such as common
interest, equal bargaining power, and ongoing relationships are absent in both
employee and consumer arbitration cases); see also Maureen A. Weston, Checks on
Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith
Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 601 (2001) (noting that
mandatory arbitration agreements in both employment and consumer contracts are
not the product of true negotiation but are presented on an adhesion basis by the
party in a position of economic power).
224. See, e.g., Senderowicz, supra note 146, at 283-84 (commenting that, under
Gilmer, while courts may find that contracts between consumers and businesses
involve greater inequality of bargaining power than contracts between employers and
employees, most courts do not).
225. See, e.g., Green, supra note 2, at 117 (arguing that parties to an arbitration
agreement, whether employer/employee or business/consumer, only have truly
equal bargaining power when they can both freely negotiate terms, seek legal advice
and specify how their legal rights will be enforced if a dispute occurs).
226. See, e.g., Mclaughlin, supra note 13, at 916 (asserting that there are fewer and
fewer employment contracts not subject to arbitration); see also Senderowicz, supra
note 146, at 276 (commenting that arbitration provisions are an increasingly
common feature of many consumer contracts).
227. See Senderowicz, supra note 146, at 303 (conceding that it is not only
unrealistic to ask a business to begin a relationship with its customers by discussing
potential lawsuits, but unlikely that a business drafting an arbitration clause would
point out the negative aspects of arbitration to a customer it is hoping to have to sign
the agreement).
228. See generally Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 95-96 (2000)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (suggesting that businesses have more knowledge than
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require one party to a contract to pay the majority of the arbitration
229
230
The Cole court rejected that argument
fees must be rejected.
outright, stating that it was doubtful that  arbitrators care about who
231
pays them, so long as they are paid for their services. Additionally,
the Cole court found that if an arbitrator were likely to favor an
employer over an employee, it would be because the employer would
be a source of future business, not because the employer was paying
232
the fees. The same is true of consumer to business contracts.
Numerous commentators have posed suggestions to bolster a
consumers status in commercial arbitration233 or protect consumers
234
from commercial arbitration altogether.
However, because the
Supreme Court has invalidated state regulations requiring disclosure
or notice to consumers of the arbitration agreement and its
235
consequences, courts may find many of these  solutions invalid
236
under the FAA. One advocate of informed consent for consumers
237
But even if
has suggested amending the FAA to require it.
consumers about arbitration); see also Miller, supra note 9, at 303 (asserting that
consumers do not and cannot negotiate the terms of the contracts they sign,
regardless of whether they understand the terms).
229. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP . R ESOL. 89, 89 (arguing that requiring a
business to  subsidize a consumers arbitration claim would cause the business to
raise prices by making arbitration more expensive to the business). In addition,
Ware argues that if the business were required to pay all the arbitration fees, it would
increase the number of cases the business would have to pay for, since more
consumers would bring claims if the financial barrier were lowered. See id.
230. See Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(rejecting the argument that it would be  perversion of the arbitration process to
have the arbitrator paid by only one party); see also Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 96
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that businesses, as  repeat players in
arbitration, have more knowledge about the process and its costs).
231. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485.
232. See id. n.17 (suggesting that since employers are more likely to be repeat
players in arbitration, arbitrators are more likely to rule in the employers favor in
order to increase the chances of the employer selecting that arbitration provider to
arbitrate future claims).
233. See, e.g., Senderowicz, supra note 146, at 279 (proposing adjustments to the
FAA to improve informed consent by consumers while still preserving the benefits of
arbitration to both parties).
234. See generally Sternlight, supra note 141, at 766 (outlining arguments a
consumer could make to challenge an arbitration clause and evaluating their
effectiveness).
235. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (finding
that the FAA pre-empts state regulations that attempt to protect consumers from
arbitration clauses).
236. See, e.g., Doctors Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996)
(invalidating a Montana statute requiring notice to consumers of the arbitration
clauses in their commercial contracts).
237. See Senderowicz, supra note 146, at 302 (proposing to amend section 2 of the
FAA so that it would apply to consumer contracts only if the business provided
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disclosure requirements were narrowly tailored to avoid federal preemption, full disclosure or even explanation of the arbitration clause
238
Therefore, a court-created rule
by a business is unrealistic.
requiring businesses to pay the costs of arbitration is the most feasible
solution for low-income consumers forced to arbitrate because it does
not require congressional amendment of the FAA or a large overhaul
of the current method of business-to-consumer transactions.
C ONCLUSION
Critics have long complained about mandatory arbitration for
239
Arbitration can be substantially more expensive for
consumers.
240
consumers than judicial litigation.
Yet despite arguments against
the arbitration of consumer contracts, the Supreme Court has
241
enforced such agreements and even articulated a policy favoring
242
mandatory arbitration.
This Comment has proposed that one way to ease the financial
burden of mandatory arbitration on low-income consumers and to
make arbitration a more equal method of dispute resolution is to
require businesses to pay the costs of arbitration. A court-created
rule requiring businesses to pay is not inconsistent with the Supreme
Courts latest pronouncement on consumer arbitration in Green
243
Tree because it does not weaken the Courts enforcement of
arbitration, but merely changes the division of costs for the
additional consideration for the consumer agreeing to the arbitration clause, and the
business provided realistic information to the consumer regarding the procedural
differences between arbitration and litigation).
238. See id. at 303 (suggesting that a business that was required to point out or
explain an arbitration clause would likely accentuate the positive aspects of
arbitration to induce the customers to sign the agreement).
239. See, e.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 32, at 333 (arguing that consumers
have been prejudiced by the Supreme Courts pro-arbitration policy); see also Smith,
supra note 159, at 1222 (asserting that mandatory arbitration  effectively strips
consumers of their rights to protect themselves from large corporations and
jeopardizes the American judicial process. ).
240. See Smith, supra note 159, at 1242 (noting that arbitration may be financially
detrimental to low-income consumers, since it is more costly than litigation for
individual consumer claims).
241. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000)
(enforcing the mandatory arbitration of a financing agreement, despite the
consumers claims that it would be prohibitively expensive).
242. See Moses H. Cone Meml Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (articulating the Supreme Courts liberal policy toward arbitration); see also
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (finding that
attacks on the adequacy of the arbitral forum are  far out of step with the Supreme
Courts strong endorsement of arbitration as a method of resolving disputes).
243. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (refusing to invalidate the arbitration agreement
because it would undermine the Courts pro-arbitration policy).
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procedure, which would ultimately be implemented by the providers
of arbitration, and enforced by the courts. In fact, requiring
businesses to pay would ensure that no consumer was ever precluded
from vindicating his or her claims in arbitration, a situation the Green
Tree majority recognized could be a problem for low-income
244
consumers. Since several lower courts have required an employer
245
to pay the arbitration fees when forcing an employee to arbitrate,
courts should similarly require businesses forcing consumers to
arbitrate to pay the costs involved in mandatory arbitration. A courtcreated rule would allow low-income consumers to pursue their
claims against businesses in arbitration as easily as they can pursue
such claims in court.

244. See id. (finding that large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant from
effectively vindicating his or her rights in the arbitral forum).
245. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (holding that an
employee cannot be required to arbitrate his or her claims as a condition of
employment if the arbitration agreement requires the employee to pay all or part of
the arbitrators fees and expenses).
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